Pakistan: A General Meltdown
Don’t be fooled, the latest chapter in the story of Pakistan is, at root, a simple and age old tale: a desperate man is doing all he can to hold on to power.
On November 3, General Musharraf declared a state of emergency, kicking out most of the supreme court, closing down local media outlets, locking up human rights activists and clamping down on all parts of civil society. If it seems as if this doesn’t have anything to do with terrorism that’s because, well, it doesn’t.
If the compelling threat Musharraf saw as endangering the very existence of Pakistan was terrorism, why use all available resources to lock up human rights activists and lawyers? And the only threat the judiciary were posing was to Musharraf himself.
It’s difficult to see any good path out of this mess, almost impossible to see one that leaves Musharraf in power. From the general’s point of view, the only option I can see is as follows: he calls off the emergency, allows elections to go ahead in January, stands down as army chief, but keeps his role as president for the next five years (free of the judiciary that was challenging his recent illegitimate election). This may sound a rather benign conclusion. It isn’t, as it obscures one overwhelming reality: the emergency that has just taken place.
The primary point is that the first independent judiciary in Pakistan’s history has been purged and replaced by a pliant rabble of opportunists. It is notable, and disgraceful, that Western powers have not made the chief justice’s reinstatement an absolute priority. The outside world might not care, but the people in Pakistan do. Any regime that comes in on the back of this purge will have no legitimacy in the eyes of the people and that will lead to instability and a fertile breeding ground for extremist forces in the medium to long term.
Musharraf has made it absolutely clear that he feels himself to be above the law, above the constitution, above any checks and balances. Anyone who believes him when he says that he has taken a ‘back seat’ over the last five years is, simply, clueless. The functioning democracy that he rigged up was always a charade, with one puppet prime minister following another.
To quote an excellent local editorial, ‘no one can or should try to remain above institutions… Musharraf’s dilemma was, and remains, that he wants the institutions to become strong but simultaneously desires to remain above and beyond their reach’.
In short, there is no way forward for Musharraf that can be in the long-term interests of Pakistan and the wider world. He must go, and be replaced by an impartial interim government with military backing, clearing the path for genuine elections early next year – with all key political leaders allowed back from exile. Anything else would be a sham, and leave a volatile and precarious legacy.
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Benazir Bhutto has returned and a triumphant parade has turned into tragedy.
Despite some newspapers instantly pointing the finger at Al Qaeda, the really worrying fact is there are many groups who could have pulled off this bloody attack. It’s worth keeping in mind that this is the third time in recent months that PPP rallies have been targeted – with different culprits on different occasions. And official investigations in Pakistan rarely, if ever, provide any answers.
This time round, the government (as usual) instantly made vague accusations against extremists and terrorists, while BB’s loyal husband enigmatically suggested that members of the government might have been behind the blast. Benazir herself has accused allies of former President General Zia-ul-Haq. Zia, who had Benazir’s father executed and later died in a plane crash, is infamous for promoting radical Islamic elements within the army. In blaming his allies, Benazir is implying that Musharraf has been unsuccessful in rooting out these elements, which he claims to have done. Whatever the reality, all these stories fit the interests of those that tell them: the PPP is desperate to be seen as not in the pocket of the military establishment (Islamist or otherwise), while the establishment is keen to perpetuate the story that they are the last bulwark against terror.
These bomb blasts were an unforgivable tragedy, but sadly predictable. Power in Pakistan has always functioned through patronage and loyalty, at the expense of continuity and institutional strength. Each successive regime has propped itself up by harnessing a motley array of allies, who have thrived in the shadows. And at every step, the prevailing power has been supported by the West. The justification for this has always been short-term expediency. Yet the result is instability and an opportunity for the forces of terror, however motivated.
The problem cannot be stamped out by one strong leader. It requires a more nuanced, holistic approach. This means ending the deals behind closed doors which entrench the powerful and alienate the people from the political process. Strengthening power through institutions rather than power through patronage is essential, otherwise the state will remain weak, bitterness will simmer, and the bloodshed will continue.
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Pakistani politics is a Machiavellian realm almost impenetrable to the outside world. There’s a sea of acronyms to wrestle with; leading politicians change loyalties more often than Rudy Giuliani says 9-11; plausible deniability is the government’s preferred modus operandi; and nobody is free of an agenda. Having said that, sometimes you don’t need to see someone slip on a banana skin to know that what’s happening on stage is a farce.
The president of Pakistan is elected by the sitting parliament. Fair enough. Except last week General Musharraf was elected by the same parliament for the second time, even though its mandate will expire in a matter of days. Why couldn’t he wait for the new elections to be held? Well, because he might lose. Besides, why should he have to trust to the vagaries of the public whim? He is, as his recent autobiography made quite clear, the Commando Saviour of the Nation. Amazingly, this simple fact (that he’s been elected twice by the same parliament, not that he’s a Commando Saviour) is almost never mentioned in the international press.
The Pakistan People’s Party (the largest opposition party) anointed this unholy re-election after cutting a deal with the Commando. This deal is another farce. It gives effective amnesty to the corrupt PPP and to the Muhajir Qaumi Movement. The MQM, for want of a more damning description, are a bunch of murderous thugs who rule Karachi like the Mafia used to rule Sicily – remote controlled by their leader who lives it up in London. Though, in fairness, at least the Mafia have an ethical code. The deal also institutionalised the ability to let off crooks when it’s politically expedient by giving power to the ‘Parliamentary Committee on Ethics’ (no sniggering at the back please).
The icing on this poisonous little cake is its title: the ‘National Reconciliation Ordinance’. Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, the value-free political opportunist who was one of the chief architects of the NRO, clearly stated it had nothing to do with national reconciliation and everything to do with political expediency: ‘The PPP was engaged in a game with us and we played our cards in a better manner and won the last round’.
Don’t get me wrong. Personally, I’m rather fond of old Mush. His heart is in the right place and he’s great fun at parties. But if the last few years have made anything clear it’s that good intentions and sincerity are really not the point in geopolitics. So, as General Musharraf himself said recently, ‘let sanity prevail’ so we can see this madness for what it really is. After all, our own security depends upon it.
The West’s attitude to Pakistan has always been riddled with short-term thinking. And this has caused no end of problems. It’s just naïve to hope that a strong man can single-handedly hold back the forces of terror; if only it were a cartoon strip battle of Good versus Evil, life would be much simpler. The fact is that without the rule of law, without a thriving opposition, without a clear process of succession, the Pakistani state is more brittle. And if it is more brittle, it is less able to tackle the threats within, and a greater gulf develops between the people and the ruling elite. While his personal intentions may be noble, the damage to civil society and the courts which Musharraf has inflicted make the country more volatile. And his opportunistic deals, of which the NRO is not the first, do not help the long-term security situation in the nation, or the wider world.